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ABSTRACT
The controversial issues of terrorism and militancy 
have generated contemporary interests and different 
interpretations have emerged on how to combat and 
manage these dangerous events. This study widens 
understanding of moral disengagement mechanism 
application in the perpetuation of inhumanities within 
the context of oil terrorist and militant behaviors. The 
research findings and model are explicit on how people 
form moral evaluations of agents who are forced to 
make morally relevant decisions over times in context 
of crisis situations. Quite crucially, understanding the 
context of terrorism and militancy provides policymak-
ers, emergency and crisis managers better analysis 
and response to such events. The research fundamental 
purpose was to investigate the mediating role of moral 
disengagement on delinquency of oil terrorism and 
militancy; and considered implications for emergency 
and crisis management practices. The study found that 
situational-induced crises such as oil terrorism and 
militancy were sufficient to account for an individual's 
misdeeds and unethical or inhumane decisions made 
under frustration and agitation may be perceived as 
less indicative of one's fundamental character. Findings 
suggest that more repugnant delinquencies could have 
been committed in the name of justice than in the name 
of injustice, avenues for future research. In context, the 
result of the moral disengagement scale shows that 
morality of delinquency (oil terrorism and militancy) 
is accomplished by cognitively redefining the morality 
of such acts. The main finding is that people in resist-
ance movements are rational actors making rational 
choices. The authors argue that theorists, policymak-
ers, and practitioners must give  meaningful attention 
to  understanding the multidimensional nature of 
emergency, crisis and disaster management for better 
strength of synthesis between theory and practice. The 
research is concluded by thorough examination of the 
implication and limitations for future research and 
practice.
Key words: moral disengagement, oil terrorism, 
militancy, emergency, crisis and disaster
INTRODUCTION
In this research, the construct of moral disen-
gagement was applied in the context of emergency 
and crisis management of oil terrorism and militancy 
in Nigeria. However, these terms “emergency, crisis 
and disaster” continue to be problematic in concepts, 
methodologies, and applications in the face of dan-
gerous events such as terrorism and militancy. The 
research findings and model are explicit on how peo-
ple form moral evaluations of agents who are forced 
to make morally relevant decisions over times in 
context of crisis situations. We argue that theorists, 
policymakers, and practitioners must give meaningful 
attention to understanding the multifacet nature of 
emergency, crisis and disaster management for better 
strength of synthesis between theory and practice. 
A useful analogy is the traditional argument put 
forward by Quarantelli1 in the debate entitled “what 
is a disaster?” Where it was asserted that the main 
reason for clarification is because otherwise scholars 
who think they are communicating with one another 
are really talking of somewhat different phenomena. 
Crucially, this research did not advance such debate 
but reveal the relevance of understanding that emer-
gency, crisis and disaster are practically different and 
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depend on the context, location, and knowledge of first 
responders.
A number of theorists have acknowledged the dif-
ference between emergency, crisis and disaster man-
agement.1-7 Borodzicz2 provided some useful clarifica-
tion of the terms—emergencies, crises and disasters. 
It has been acknowledged in past research that a risk 
could give rise to a crisis which in turn could become 
a disaster. In differentiating between the terms, the 
definitions presented by Borodzicz2 can provide valu-
able insights for their management: emergencies can 
be defined as situations requiring a rapid and highly 
structured response where the risks for critical deci-
sion makers can, to a relative degree, be well defined. 
Crises are also situations requiring a rapid response 
but the risks for critical decision makers are difficult 
to define owing to an ill-structure in the situation. 
However, a disaster can be defined as a cultural con-
struction of reality and distinct from both emergency 
and crisis because it represents the product of the 
former.2 This definition implies that a disaster may 
typically involve dealing with a number of smaller 
ongoing crises and emergencies. The central argu-
ment offered here is that emergencies, crises and 
disasters management differ conceptually and practi-
cally thus requiring a multidisciplinary approach for 
effective sustainability.
In fact, to better understand emergency, crisis 
and disaster, and design effective proactive and 
pragmatic strategies, it is important that one has an 
understanding of what it means to different people 
in different parts of the world. More realistically, 
concepts and strategies are only relevant when they 
reflect the local interpretations because infusing 
global (or perhaps a segmental—like Western, Asia, 
Arab, or African) meaning to solve unstructured and 
unconventional crises (eg, oil terrorism and militancy) 
can be catastrophic in itself if local risk perceptions 
are exclusively neglected. Perhaps, this is the rea-
son emergency and crisis management strategies 
and practices in recent years appear ineffective and 
unsustainable. The suggestion is to think globally but 
act locally when responding to cases of emergency and 
crisis management. We also note that disasters are 
the irreversible and typically overwhelming result of 
ill-handled emergency and crisis.2 Quite debatable, 
Dombrowsky3 advanced that “disasters do not cause 
effects. The effects are what we call a disaster.” More 
clearly, evidence suggest that in managing disaster 
we may typically be involved in responding and deal-
ing with a number of related partial emergencies 
and crises. This analogy is particularly useful in the 
context of oil terrorism and militancy incidents. The 
next section examines and reviews the relevant sali-
ent constructs to advance the theory and practice of 
emergency and crisis management.
A REVIEW OF RELEVANT SALIENT CONCEPTS
There are several salient concepts in this research 
that need to be defined and discussed in the context of 
the research background and focus. The growing secu-
rity concerns over terrorism and militancy incidents 
across the globe have generated considerable interest 
among practitioners and academics.8-11 However, since 
the 9/11 terrorists attack, it appears that modern cases 
of terrorism and militancy are a fight not against ter-
rorists and militants but a fight against ideology and 
fanaticism.12,13 This perspective to the phenomenon of 
terrorism has been adopted by some countries but this 
is not particularly the main approach for what terror-
ism is and how the threat should be reduced for most 
countries. However, the Nigerian perspective of terror-
ism is based on the legislative (Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission [EFCC] Act 2004) framework 
which appears to categorize resistance movement/
insurgency or civil disobedience as terrorism. As the 
science and theory of terrorism settles on clear con-
siderations around the counterterrorism response to 
the reduction of seemingly problematic unstructured 
crisis such as oil terrorism and militancy, increasing 
attentions and strategies have principally focus on 
consequences and reduction or containment strate-
gies. However, as leaders (government authorities and 
agencies) and managers (organizations and relevant 
firms affected) grapple with the realities of develop-
ing response strategies tailored to what is perceived 
as global problem with local origin, the consequential 
implications are clear.
These response strategies are not particularly tai-
lored toward the context of such dangerous events (eg, 
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oil terrorism and militancy) and perhaps even neglect 
normative concerns and implications for sustainable 
emergency and crisis management practice. In real-
ity, effective strategies toward terrorism-related and 
militancy-related crises should be tailored to specific 
vulnerability and geographic location and therefore 
the paucity of clear regional strategies becomes a lead-
ing constraint in decision-making process. In Nigeria, 
terrorism is broadly defined in section 15 of the EFCC 
(Establishment) Act 2004 as follows:
. . . any act which is a violation of the 
Criminal Code or the Penal Code and 
which may endanger the life, physical 
integrity or freedom of, or cause serious 
injury or death to any person, any number 
or group of persons or causes or may cause 
damage to public or private property, natu-
ral resources, environmental or cultural 
heritage and is calculated or intended 
to intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or 
induce any government, body, institution, 
the general public or any segment thereof, 
to do or abstain from doing an act, or adopt 
or abandon a particular stand point or to 
act according to certain principles; or dis-
rupt any publicservice, the delivery of any 
essential service to the public or to cre-
ate a public emergency; or create general 
insurrection in a state; or any promotion, 
sponsorship of, contribution to, command, 
aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, 
threat, conspiracy, organising, or procure-
ment or any person, with the intent to 
commit any acts stated above . . .
The oil terrorism and militancy in the Niger Delta 
when viewed in the context of the legal framework of 
EFCC Act 2004 appears to constitute terrorism* and 
can be fruitless as every form of resistance or civil 
disobedience can be perceived as terrorism according 
to the EFCC Act. Nevertheless, there is no superiority 
of definition in terrorism and the idea that because 
the definition of the phenomenon (terrorism) (as used 
in this research) is not in line with how most western 
researchers use the concept calls for avoidance of its 
use in the Nigerian perspective can be misleading. 
This is because there is no consensus on the univer-
sal application of the phenomenon (terrorism) and as 
such its use should be subjected to local context even 
though agreement exists on the need for global col-
laboration.8,9,12-14
In practice, a number of Niger Delta people do 
not perceive oil terrorism and militancy as terror-
ism rather a struggle for self-determination against 
exploitation of their natural resources by the Nigerian 
state and environmental degradation by international 
oil companies. This is evidence from the support given 
to what many local people describe as a liberation 
struggle/resistance movement and movement toward 
sustainable local communities.15,16 This implies that 
when local risk perceptions of terrorism and mili-
tancy are entirely discounted, emergency and crisis 
management strategies devoted to end such terrorism 
and related crises cannot be sustainable. Therefore, 
relevant strategies and approaches of emergency and 
crisis management in dealing with oil terrorism and 
militancy must be locally relevant and grounded in 
local languages and cultures. Although oil terrorism 
and militancy have global implications and as such 
perceived as global problem that requires collabora-
tive global strategies, it is clearly naïve to design 
global crisis management strategies for what perhaps 
is controversially and locally charged crises.
It is equally important to state that terrorism as 
a concept is widely disputed and debated in research 
and there are no generally acceptable definitions of 
the term. In the last decades, the scopes and defini-
tions of terrorism have undergone extensive academic 
discussions. Terrorism implies intentionality, vulner-
ability, and psychological impact.10 Terrorism risk is 
seen as uncontrollable17 and may add to the level of 
fear experienced because risks that are perceived as 
“low control” are related to worrying.11 It is argued 
that terrorism creates more fear and anxiety than nat-
urally occurring crisis with similar consequences.18,19 
*This definition of terrorism as used in this research is controversial 
because it is not in line with local risk perception of the Niger Delta 
crisis and certainly not in line with how most western researchers have 
use the term. However, as argued in this research, definition is only 
relevant to serve a purpose.
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The risk perception of terrorism which is influenced by 
threat, uncertainty, and control17 may be grossly over-
estimated. It has been found that an act of terrorism 
differs20 and therefore its concepts can be argued to be 
relevant to the circumstances under which terrorism-
related crises exist.
In the context of oil terrorism and militancy in 
the Niger Delta, several other studies and media have 
further claimed that the Niger Delta people are forced 
to insurgency and violence because the Nigerian state 
uses military power to repress them and deny them of 
justice16,21-27 over environmental degradation and pol-
lution. Similarly, Ken Saro-Wiwa (before his gruesome 
and extrajudicial killing), writer and environmental 
right activist stated that in this most sophisticated 
and unconventional war, in which no bones are broken, 
no blood spilled, and no one is maimed . . . yet men, 
women, and children die, flora, fauna, and fish perish; 
the air and water are poisoned, and finally the land 
dries up.28 This argument resonate the position and 
controversial issue surrounding the Niger Delta crisis.
MILITANCY AND OIL TERRORISM
Militancy is defined as a violent and active behav-
ior principally of the defense and support of a cause 
(mainly political) which often lead to the point of 
extremism. Therefore, a militant could be described 
as a person involved in hostile or a protest movement 
in the defense of a cause. This definition reflects some 
activities perpetrated by youths in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria on account of environmental and 
sustainability problems. In this perspective, three 
types of militants (intellectual militant, militant mobi-
lizer, and violent militant) are identified in previous 
research.24 The focus here is on violent militants in the 
Niger Delta who often kidnap oil workers for ransom, 
attack oil pipelines, installations, and platforms with 
explosives, and the seizure of oil barges, oil wells, flow 
stations and support vessels, and other oil facilities 
including state assets to prevent the exploitation and/
or distribution of crude oil or its refined products.
Conversely, oil terrorism means the deliberate acts 
of blowing up oil pipelines, installations, and platforms 
with explosives, and seizure of oil barges, oil wells, 
flow stations, support vessels, and other oil facilities 
to prevent the exploitation and/or distribution of crude 
oil or its refined products.29 The Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) performed 
the first act of oil terrorism in Nigeria when they blew 
up Shell's Opobo pipeline in Delta State.30 Why inter-
est in oil terrorism and militancy in the Delta? The 
Delta region has overestimated 40 billion barrels in oil 
reserves and places Nigeria as the biggest oil producer 
in Africa and eleventh in the world. Oil crisis in the 
Delta significantly affect both national and interna-
tional communities in several forms.15,31 For example, 
fewer crises in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria lead 
to increase in Nigeria oil production output thereby 
balancing the global oil supply which consequently 
help stabilize price. However, the contrast would hap-
pen when there are increased crises within the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria.
Oil terrorism is perpetuated by the militants 
within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The pre-
sumption has fuelled the believe that oil terrorism 
can be avoided by wholesale transformation of Niger 
Delta militants, a core reason for the presidential dec-
laration of amnesty in the Delta on June 25, 2009 to 
curb militancy and encourage militants to abandoned 
violence.15 The amnesty proclamation meant that all 
persons who have directly or indirectly participated 
in the commission of offences associated with mili-
tants' activities in the Niger Delta were to surrender 
and hand over all equipment, weapons, arms, and 
ammunitions including execution of the renunciation 
of Militancy Forms specified in the schedule.32 Under 
the amnesty program, ex-militants are paid monthly 
allowance and undergo rehabilitation and skills 
acquisition training programs (home and abroad) 
melt to reintegrate them into society. However, the 
presumed solution of amnesty to the Niger Delta mili-
tants to curb oil terrorism and militancy is misleading 
and may be encouraging other disgruntled youths to 
further perpetuate violent behavior.
MORAL DISENGAGEMENT: OIL TERRORISM  
AND MILITANCY ISSUE
A number of studies have revealed that the decline 
of civic virtues, unethical behavior in different contexts 
of social life,33-35 and war, genocide, corruption, violent 
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behavior, terrorism,36-41 and organization crises and 
disasters15 are perpetuated and disengaged through 
mechanisms of moral disengagement. These mecha-
nisms (moral justification, attribution of blame, dehu-
manization, and diffusion of responsibility, distorting 
the consequences, euphemistic labeling, advantageous 
comparison, and displacement of responsibility) allow 
people to misbehave without feeling obliged to any 
kind of reparation and without carrying any need to 
change the moral standards they are ignoring.42(p504) 
Therefore, oil terrorism and militancy may be medi-
ated by the role of moral disengagement. Thus, this 
study explicitly draws a narrow focus on oil terror-
ists or militants' behavior rather than consequences 
which are a signature feature of moral cognition. We 
propose that oil terrorism and militancy link is related 
indirectly through the construct of moral disengage-
ment.15,36,37 The theory of moral disengagement seeks 
to explain or analyze the means through which indi-
viduals rationalize their unethical or unjust actions. 
This is oftentimes missed in the study of terrorism 
and insurgency but imperative for building sustain-
able emergency and crisis management in the context 
of oil terrorists and militants' behaviors.
Moral disengagement can affect detrimental 
behavior both directly and indirectly.43 Social cogni-
tive theory addresses the exercise of moral agency.44 
The disengagement may centre on redefining harmful 
conduct (oil terrorism and militancy) as honorable by 
moral justification, exonerating social comparison, and 
sanitizing language. In another context, it may focus 
on agency of action (environmental degradation and 
self-determination) so that perpetrators (militants) 
can minimize their role in causing harm by diffusion 
and displacement of responsibility. Furthermore, it 
may involve minimizing or distorting the harm that 
flows from detrimental actions; and the disengagement 
may include dehumanizing and blaming the victims of 
the maltreatment.45 What is clear from research is 
that notion of moral disengagement may have influ-
ence on oil terrorists and militants' behavior. Indeed, 
in this explanatory framework, personal factors, such 
as moral thought and self-evaluative reactions, moral 
conduct, and environmental influences operate as 
interacting determinants of each other.43,46,47
Individuals may try to justify their militant behav-
ior using the mechanisms of moral  disengagement. 
For example, prototypical evidence might be “it is 
alright to destroy oil pipelines and national assets 
because of environmental degradation.” Similarly, 
particularly as concerns the Niger Delta crisis, the act 
of vandals may be linked to construct of diffusion of 
responsibility and euphemistic labeling. More specifi-
cally, militant acts such as “people who treat militants 
as animals should be treated as such,” “it is alright to 
intentionally attack international oil companies and 
Nigerian security agents because they collaborate to 
pollute the Delta,” and “attacking international oil 
companies and oil platform is the expression of frus-
tration and agitation in the Delta” become morally 
palatable. Interestingly, research indicates that moral 
actions are the product of the reciprocal interplay of 
cognitive, affective, and social influences.45
In conclusion, this research clarifies the mediat-
ing role of moral disengagement in the context of oil 
terrorism and militancy activities. Most essentially, 
the work explicitly seeks to contribute to our under-
standing of normative mechanisms that could affect 
“sustainable emergency and crisis management.” The 
ultimate aims of the research are as follows: 1) criti-
cally explore how moral disengagement perpetuate 
oil terrorism and militancy incidents and consider 
implications for sustainable emergency and crisis 
management and 2) to encourage deeper reflection 
and evaluation of the possible implications of moral 
disengagement mechanisms on sustainable emer-
gency and crisis management.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 753 ex-militants (89 percent male and 
11 percent female) who were members of the MEND 
and the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 
from Port Harcourt (Nigeria) served as participants. 
The participants were not considered as a control 
group because the principal aim of the research is 
not to experiment but measures attitudes among 
militants. Although the sample can be considered as 
experimental group because it contains mainly ex-
militants, there are no alternative identical groups in 
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which to compare the results. This is due to the several 
ethical implications involved in investigating moral 
disengagement in processes of crisis management. A 
classic example is the proposal to evaluate and meas-
ure moral disengagement of military personnel when 
combating terrorism. In control group, there are two 
identical experiments that are performed—treatment 
or tested factor (experimental group) in which the 
experiment is conducted and group (control) in which 
the tested factor is not applied. In this research, the 
ideal control group would have been local indigenes 
with the same characteristics of those in the experi-
mental group (ex-militants). This situation likewise 
raises an ethical issue: how can we measure and 
evaluate moral disengagements of a group that are not 
inclined to terrorism and militancy. This can be subject 
of future research investigation. The participants were 
recruited through the assistance of two conflict resolu-
tion experts who help facilitate contacts with them. 
Following previous research,42,47,48 a survey instrument 
was adapted and developed. Although the participants 
were recruited through purposive sampling techniques 
(as to enable actors involved in the phenomena under 
investigation to be recruited), a detail letter covering 
the research aim was sent to the two conflict resolution 
experts for assessment and feedback. The survey was 
completed after three rounds between November 2013 
and January 2014. The consents of the participants 
were sought and participants had the options to volun-
tarily withdraw from the study if they felt uncomfort-
able. The samples were part of a larger current PhD 
research investigating vulnerable people and vulner-
able environment—moral disengagement in processes 
of organizational crisis.
Measures
Frequency of oil terrorism attack. The participants 
were asked to self-rate how frequently they attack a) 
oil pipelines and platforms, b) Nigerian state assets, 
c) international oil companies on a six-point scale 
(from 6 = every month, 5 = every 2 weeks, 4 = every 
week, 3 = every 3 days, 2 = everyday, to 1 = never). 
However, the participants' data have been protected 
through the research design because of the possible 
risks to them and the investigators. Personal data 
of the participants were completely eliminated and 
the interpretations of the findings were categorically 
anonymous to comply with ethical implications of 
conducting a sensitive research like this.
Moral disengagement. The study measured moral 
disengagement through the civil moral disengage-
ment scale develops by Caprara et al.47 Ex-militants 
rated their degree of acceptance of moral exonerations 
presented in 32 items covering the eight different 
mechanisms through which moral self-sanctions can 
be disengaged from oil terrorist and militant conduct. 
The scale was considered as unidimensional (α = 
0.89) similar to the original study, and a prototypical 
item is “It is alright to destroy oil pipelines and state 
assets because of environmental degradation in the 
Delta.” The moral disengagement scale was initially 
developed as a 40-item scale by Bandura et al.37 and 
Caprara et al.47 However, the scale was modified to 
ensure compatibility with the research context and 
background, and therefore reduced to 32 items four for 
each mechanism of moral disengagement which the 
participants responds to on a five-point Likert scale 
(from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree).
Demographics. The participants indicated their age 
and gender. The age of the participants range between 
19 and 42 years (M = 21.50, SD = 8.3). The surveys 
showed that nine percent had finished primary edu-
cation, 51 percent finished secondary education, 25 
percent finished tertiary education, and 15 percent 
had finished university education.
Self-recounted delinquency. The degree of ex-mili-
tants involvement was measured through a 10-item 
self-report list. Participants were asked to indicate 
how many times they had involved in oil terrorism-
related activities during the past 10 years. Items were 
grouped into two main dimensions. Oil terrorism (five 
items, α = 0.87, scores range from 0 to 17): for exam-
ple, “bombing a petrol flow station” and “blowing up 
oil pipelines, installations, and platforms with explo-
sives.” Militancy conduct (five items, α = 0.82, scores 
range from 0 to 20): for example, “have been involved 
in seizure of oil barges, oil wells, flow stations, support 
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vessels” and “threatened the Nigerian government 
over oil facilities.”
Ethical issues and implications 
The selected participants in this research have 
been granted the Nigerian Presidential Amnesty. The 
amnesty proclamation was made on the June 25, 2009 
specified in the Nigeria First Amnesty Proclamation 
Section 175 of 1999 Constitution.32 It would have 
make no practical sense theorizing on the concepts of 
oil terrorism and militancy without actual investiga-
tion of the people involved in such acts. Oftentimes, 
studies in the area of terrorism and militancy have 
advanced without real involvement of the people 
affected in such moral delinquency. In contrast, this 
study gives valuable knowledge about how perpetra-
tors rationalize their actions. In this respect, this 
study adds valuable knowledge to a research field 
that should talk more with perpetrators and use first 
hand data. However, in achieving the research aim, 
there are several numbers of ethical issues and impli-
cations that must be clarify here.
First, it was clear that oil terrorism and militancy 
as discussed in this research cannot be explained in 
abstraction without actual investigation of those who 
are directly involved in such acts. The ethical issues 
when asking perpetrators (ex-militants) to report 
criminal behaviors require clarification. These par-
ticipants (ex-militants) understood the purpose of the 
study because they have been briefed and consent to 
participate in the research. The participants perceived 
their local communities to be unsustainable because 
of environmental disasters (pollution, oil spillage, 
land contamination, gas flaring, extreme weather, and 
climate change) and therefore are more interested in 
sustainable communities. There was general agree-
ment that responding with violence as means of pro-
test over environmental disasters and oil pollution in 
the Niger Delta (Nigeria) is not a sustainable method 
of expressing frustration and agitation. Therefore, in 
this regards, this research fail to engage and spread 
the political message of the activists (ex-militants).
Second, it may appear questionable why ex-mil-
itants will benefit from telling the truth because the 
participants could benefit from reporting that they 
have committed criminal activities to spread their 
political message. Likewise, the participants could fail 
to report their criminal activities because this could 
involve the risk of being caught and punished for 
breaking the law. However, it is established that these 
participants were known offenders because they 
were part of the Nigerian government presidential 
amnesty program. Furthermore, there is no political 
message to spread by these participants because they 
were already part of government rehabitation and 
integration program. In this regards, this research 
fall shorts of spreading political message of activists 
but instead provides valuable insights on how first 
line responders (emergency and crisis managers) can 
deal with the dangerous events of oil terrorism and 
militancy in Nigeria.
RESULTS
As revealed by the participants of the current 
study, the findings show that they did not frequently 
engage in oil terrorism and militancy conduct. 
However, a significant number indicated that they 
would not mind when left with no alternative options 
(46.3 percent). In context, 25.8 percent of the partici-
pants declared to rarely engage in oil terrorism and 
militancy, 11.3 percent noted to have been frequently 
involved in oil pipelines vandalism, and blowing up 
oil pipelines and platforms with explosives, whereas 
62.9 percent of the participants declared to have 
often engaged in oil terrorism and militancy conduct 
at some point. Although the number of female par-
ticipants were low (11 percent) compared to the male 
participants, there is no statistical significance in 
terms of gender (Table 1). However, male participants 
were reported to have been involved in oil terrorism 
and militancy in the Delta.
In general, in terms of misbehavior (oil terrorism 
and militancy), at least 93.4 percent of the participants 
reported to have been involved in militancy conduct 
(46.7 percent has a score of more than 8) and 6.6 
percent in oil terrorism-related offence (4.8 percent 
has a score of more than 12). This reveals that ter-
rorists (ex-militants) have a vast set of tools at their 
disposal to conduct oil terrorism-related and militancy-
related violence. Like in previous research,49,50 male 
05-JEM_Mafimisebi_150029.indd   453 27/10/15   4:31 PM
454 Journal of Emergency Management 
Vol. 13, No. 5, September/October 2015
 participants have more moral disengagement attributes 
than females. Furthermore, the findings indicate that 
moral disengagement has a mediating role in oil terror-
ism and militancy conduct (76.2 percent has a score of 
more than 9). This confirms the proposition that oil ter-
rorism and militancy link is related indirectly through 
the construct of moral disengagement. This offers a 
sufficient explanation of understanding the contexts in 
which oil terrorism and militancy are established.
The result of the moral disengagement scale 
shows that morality of delinquency (oil terrorism and 
militancy) is accomplished by cognitively redefining 
the morality of such acts. The main message is that 
people in resistance movements are rational actors 
making rational choices. The possible implication in 
emergency and crisis management is that labeling 
an act as terrorism when it is perceived otherwise 
can lead to crisis intensification and exacerbate the 
message of the perpetrators. The definitions of what 
constitute terrorism are often disputable as reflected 
in situation where school violence7 and political group 
violence expressed by terrorist actions14 are consid-
ered as an act of terrorism. This confirm previous 
research position conducted in Australia51 that com-
munication campaigns about terrorism-related crises 
have to be framed with caution to avoid negative reac-
tions toward vulnerable people (or minorities).
In context, moral justification such as “it is alright 
to attack international oil companies and Nigerian 
government because they collaborate to pollute the 
Delta” becomes morally acceptable (89.7 percent). In 
another perspective, the present study found that 92.3 
percent of the participants indicate that “attacking 
international oil companies and oil platforms, oil wells, 
and seizure of oil barge is the expression of frustration 
and agitation in the Delta.” Research suggests that 
language shapes thought patterns on which actions 
are based.45 Our results further confirm Diener52 
positions that people behave much more cruelly when 
assaultive actions are given a sanitized label than 
when they are called aggression. What this implies is 
that pure reliance on repressive policies to deal with 
oil terrorism and militancy can be counterproductive.
Although it is yet unknown what types of govern-
ment actions (ie, nonmilitarization counterterrorism 
and militarization counterterrorism) are more effective 
in dealing with oil terrorism and militancy, the research 
findings suggest that sticks approach in defeating oil 
terrorism and militancy are unsustainable when con-
textualized over times. For example, in its brutal cam-
paign against terrorism and militancy, would Nigerian's 
government be better off concentrating on arresting, 
torturing and killing terrorists (militants), or should 
it invest more resources into improving healthcare, 
Table 1. Means and analysis of variance differences for gender among study variables
Measures M SD M male M female F
Frequency of oil terrorism attack
Oil pipelines and platforms 7.81 2.20 7.74 3.82 0.78
Nigerian state assets 6.92 2.12 6.11 2.46 0.83
International oil companies 5.36 2.54 5.47 3.04 0.50
Misbehavior
Oil terrorism 4.38 2.07 5.67 2.39 49.82*
Militancy conduct 5.72 1.89 5.22 2.97 35.92*
Moral disengagement 4.67 1.31 4.87 3.31 45.08*
Note: Frequency of oil terrorism attack extended from 1 to 6. Moral disengagement factors extended from 1 to 8. Oil terrorism 
extended from 0 to 17. Militancy conduct extended from 0 to 20.
*p < 0.001.
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 education, roads, electricity, and essential public services 
for those who reject terrorist (militant) violence? The 
research findings suggest that what Nigerian govern-
ment has done over the years to deal with oil terrorism-
related and militancy-related crises are mostly sticks 
approach which appears unsustainable and may have 
been responsible for crisis intensification. In another 
perspective, the perceived current carrot approach of 
amnesty program to militants (who represent a small 
proportion of the Niger Delta population of more than 
35 million) has gained limited success.
In another insightful analysis, Bandura45 revealed 
that by exploiting the contrast principle reprehensi-
ble acts can be made righteous. The present findings 
reveal that “militants cannot be blamed if they engage 
in oil terrorism because multinational oil companies 
degrade the environment and deliberately destroy 
people's source of livelihood through oil exploration 
and exploitation activities in the Delta” (87.3 percent). 
This suggests that what was once morally condemn-
able becomes a source of self-valuation.45 Finally, 
overall majority of the participant reveal that “people 
cannot be held accountable for violence committed 
because they are push to the wall” (79.6 percent). 
This is displacement of responsibility as Bandura46 
noted they view their actions as stemming from the 
dictates of authorities rather than being personally 
responsible for them. This makes it complicated to 
entirely rely on militarization approach in dealing 
with oil terrorism and militancy. As argued, the cog-
nitive dimensions such as moral justification, euphe-
mistic labeling, and advantageous comparison which 
influence an individual's response to oil terrorism and 
militancy require radical approaches to effectively 
manage. Furthermore, the recent dramatic swing in 
oil prices might impacts the subject matter of this 
research. For example, reduction in global oil prices 
reduces Nigerian government revenue. Petroleum 
exports revenue accounts for more than 90 percent 
of total exports revenue in Nigeria. Therefore, we 
expect that government approaches and strategies to 
oil terrorism and militancy in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria would change significantly. In this context, 
sustainable approach such as education, employment 
generation, reducing environmental risks, and host 
communities participation in oil production could be 
the game changers in resolving the crisis. Likewise, it 
is possible that there would be increased militariza-
tion approach in protecting critical infrastructure in 
the oil and gas industry. This would be likely because 
Nigerian government depends largely on petroleum 
exports revenue for governance.
DISCUSSION
The overall aim of this article was to analyze 
the mediating role of moral disengagement in the 
context of oil terrorist and militant conduct. The 
present research found that oil terrorism and mili-
tancy link is related indirectly through the construct 
of moral disengagement. For example, vandalism 
of oil pipeline is mostly blamed on unemployment, 
environmental pollution caused by multinational oil 
companies, and unsustainable means of livelihood. 
Therefore, the moral evaluation of such acts should be 
the focus of redirecting emergency and crisis manage-
ment strategies when dealing with oil terrorism and 
militancy conduct. The results further show consider-
able evidence to argue that the mechanisms of moral 
disengagement have a mediating role in oil terrorism 
and militancy. In this perspective, our research find-
ings established that more people are likely to engage 
in vandalism of oil pipeline and other delinquencies 
when possibilities to validate such actions exist. The 
mechanisms of moral disengagement permit different 
types of conduct (such as blowing up of oil pipelines, 
seizure of oil barge, bombing of oil platform, and 
kidnapping) to be perpetuated by militants with the 
same moral standards. This modifies people's risk 
perception and creates a need for sensemaking and 
socially supportive communication and engagement 
of stakeholders. Misperception of oil terrorism and 
militancy may cause cruel behaviors become morally 
palatable for delinquents, and make militarization 
approach becomes unsustainable.
Like in previous research,46,53,54 through moral 
justification of violent means, militants perceive them-
selves as fighting ruthless oppressors (international 
oil companies and Nigerian state), protecting their 
cherished values (environment and sources of liveli-
hood), and saving humanity (Niger Delta people) from 
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suppression and environmental degradation. Thus, it 
is critical to contextualize that it became necessary 
to destroy the town to save it. In other words, moral 
justifications sanctify the violent means.45 Indeed, as 
hypothesized, moral disengagement perpetuates oil 
terrorist and militant behavior. Findings indicated 
that militants were more likely to use the mechanisms 
of moral disengagement to justify their actions. What 
possible implications could this have on crisis manage-
ment in the Delta? Should multinational oil companies 
and Nigerian state accept full responsibility for such 
acts because of environmental degradation? Besides, 
people will behave in ways they normally repudiate 
if a legitimate authority accepts responsibility for the 
effects of their conduct.52,55 Thus, it is clear that self-
exemption from gross inhumanities through displace-
ment of responsibility is revealed most gruesomely45 
in oil terrorists and militants conduct.
Ex-militants rather believed extremism in defense 
of environmental right is no vice.56 This dictum repre-
sents an adamant belief that oil terrorism and mili-
tancy cannot be considered reprehensible considering 
that government officials are insensitive to the people 
plights; a view that 89.6 percent of the participants 
shared. In specific context, such belief represents 
distortion of consequences and further suggests that 
mechanisms of moral disengagement perpetuate and 
mediate militants conduct. Thus, as confirmation of 
existing research,45 moral disengagement mediate oil 
terrorist and militant conduct. In summary, it appears 
that more repugnant delinquencies have been commit-
ted in the name of justice than in the name of injustice. 
Perhaps, future research could investigate the role of 
moral disengagement in the process of seeking justice.
CONCLUSION
The research findings and model are explicit on 
how people form moral evaluations of agents who 
are forced to make morally relevant decisions over 
times. The study found that situational-induced crises 
such as oil terrorism and militancy were sufficient to 
account for an individual's misdeeds and unethical 
or inhumane decisions made under frustration and 
agitation may be perceived as less indicative of one's 
fundamental character. In contrast, the results suggest 
that emergency and crisis managers (ie, Nigerian gov-
ernment and agencies) are more likely to portray and 
treat such unethical or amoral behaviors as someone's 
(militant's) immoral character. Findings confirmed 
that moral disengagement influences oil terrorist 
and militant behavior. This enables people in resist-
ance movements considered themselves as rational 
actors making rational choices. In critical context, this 
implies that in emergency and crisis management, 
considerable efforts should be on addressing the moral 
imbalance that exists between perpetrators and crisis 
responders. For example, establishing risk culture edu-
cation programs for local communities and occasional 
(but regular) risk and crisis management forum that 
bring local communities, multinational oil companies, 
and government agencies together are most beneficial.
This exploratory research has revealed the medi-
ating role of moral disengagement in the context of oil 
terrorist and militant conduct, and the impact these 
mechanisms might have on sustainable crisis man-
agement. However, given the relatively small samples 
used in the study and the limitations to a particular 
region (Nigeria, Africa), the research findings are not 
used to make definitive claims about oil terrorists' and 
militants' behavior globally. A more delicate limita-
tion is implications of investigating moral disengage-
ment without having a control group. This can impact 
the research findings because it would be difficult to 
conclude that the study measures attitudes among 
militants or something (attitudes) that are com-
mon in the Niger Delta area. Nonetheless, it should 
be acknowledged that the study used experimental 
group (ex-militants) as sample and therefore we 
can argue that the study measures attitudes among 
militants. It is essential that in future research, the 
issues surrounding control group are considered when 
reporting the findings. In an insightful perspective, 
we acknowledge that the current dramatic swing in 
oil prices may impact the subject matter contained 
in this research. For example, it is anticipated that 
Nigerian government response to oil terrorism and 
militancy will change to a more sustainable approach.
Despite such limitations, the study critically 
explores the mediating role of moral disengagement 
and how its mechanisms penetrate oil terrorist and 
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militant behavior. It may be more relevant to work on 
the moral self-regulation of oil terrorist and militant 
as a way of disinhibiting their perceived inhumani-
ties. As evidence from the study, morality is rooted in 
a self-reactive selfhood45 and thus instituting lines 
of accountability could curtail moral disengagement. 
Furthermore, results suggest that more repugnant 
delinquencies could have been committed in the name 
of justice than in the name of injustice, avenues for 
future research. Additionally, the findings indicate that 
discussing how oil terrorism and militancy could practi-
cally affect people, environment and sustainable crisis 
management is crucial toward disinhibiting militants 
from such delinquency. In summary, moral disengagers 
(militants and oil terrorists) need to understand how 
their activities affect the world around them and how 
they could be morally engaged to seek sustainable crisis 
management approach. Hence, relevant authorities in 
Nigeria would need to engage them and discuss risk 
perception of environmental issues within the Delta.
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